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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has caused the death of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals and the displacement of millions.1 Efforts to refer 
the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) have 
consistently failed despite well-documented reports about the commission 
of serious crimes in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons against 
civilians, torture, the use of child soldiers, and crimes of sexual violence.2
Only a handful of situations have been investigated thus far, mostly within 
national jurisdictions of western European nations.3 While the Security 
Council has been deadlocked with respect to Syria, the General Assembly 
passed a resolution in December 2016, establishing the International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under 
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 
2011 (Mechanism or IIIM).4 As of today, it is unclear whether the evidence 
gathered through the Mechanism will be used in a subsequent prosecution, 
and whether the work of the Mechanism will lead toward accountability for 
those responsible for Syrian atrocities.
                                                          
* Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law.  The author would like to thank the organizers of International Law Weekend 2017 for 
the opportunity to present these remarks and discuss other arguments from this Article.
1. Jack Moore, Syria War Death Toll Hits 321,000 with Further 145,000 Missing: Monitor,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sixth-anniversary-syrian-conflict-loo
ms-war-monitor-says-465000-killed-or-567181 (reporting that as of March 2017, the war in Syria has 
resulted in 321,000 deaths and that an additional 145,000 individuals were missing).
2. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails As 
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to Prosecutions Or
Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT’L REL. (May 26, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanis
m-bridge-to-prosecutions-or-evidentiary-limbo/.
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Parallel to the ongoing quest for accountability, the international 
community has been concerned with negotiating peace for Syria in order to 
end the violent civil war, which has already claimed thousands of lives.5
Achieving peace in Syria may not necessarily lead toward immediate 
accountability, and conversely, a focus on accountability may derail the 
peace process.  This Article will explore whether the dual goals of peace 
and justice can be reconciled in the Syrian context, and how these goals 
may be properly sequenced, in order to potentially achieve long-lasting 
peace in Syria without sacrificing justice.  Part I will explore the tension 
between the dual goals of peace and justice in both a theoretical manner, as 
well as in the Syrian context.  Part II will describe existing accountability 
models in the international community and how these may be applicable in 
the Syrian situation, and Part III will focus on the work of the Mechanism, 
an already established model of preliminary accountability for Syria. This 
Article will conclude that peace and justice may appear irreconcilable in 
some contexts, but that such goals may co-exist if properly sequenced and 
applied to a particular situation, such as Syria.
II. DUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND JUSTICE
Peace and justice may co-exist in some contexts and societies.  Peace 
and justice may however appear irreconcilable in other transitional justice 
scenarios.  In some situations, the pursuit of justice and accountability may 
be viewed as undermining the prospects of peace. In such transitional 
justice societies, the pursuit of peace may appear more important than the 
quest for accountability, and the latter may be sacrificed in order to halt 
bloodshed and achieve peace.6 In other situations, however, it may be 
possible to sequence peace and justice—to seek the end of violence first but 
to focus on accountability later.
In several Latin American countries, dictators which had ruled such 
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s peacefully stepped out of power, 
but requested blanket amnesties for themselves and other members of their 
oppressive regimes.7 In such instances, it may be argued that accountability 
                                                          
5. News Focus: Syria, UN NEWS CTR., https://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infoc
usID=146 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting on ongoing Syrian peace negotiations, and that parties 
to the peace process have met in Geneva four times during 2017, and three times during 2016; reporting 
also that parties to the peace process attended, in parallel, Astana peace talks in Kazakhstan in early 
2017).
6. See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY 
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 1–6 (Elin Skaar et al. eds., 2016).
7. Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L.J. 707, 720–29 (1999); see Jo-Marie Burt, The Torture Report: Latin America’s Lessons for the 
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was sacrificed toward the pursuit of peace and a peaceful transition to 
democracy.  In many Latin American countries, however, accountability 
has become important and amnesty laws have been overturned or ignored.  
Thus, criminal trials have moved forward in several countries, including 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Guatemala.8 It may be argued that 
while the pursuit of peace and the goal of a peaceful transition to 
democracy trumped accountability in the first instance in many Latin 
American societies, but that accountability remained important nonetheless 
and is currently at the forefront in many such countries and societies.
In other instances, peace and justice have always co-existed, either 
through peace accords coupled with modified accountability mechanisms, 
or through peace accords and concurrent prosecutions. South Africa is an 
example of the former.  When the South African apartheid regime 
negotiated its surrender of power and agreed to transition to a democratic 
regime, questions of accountability prominently surfaced.9 Would 
members of the apartheid regime face accountability for the atrocities 
which they committed while in power? If so, pursuant to which model of 
accountability? Accountability became a stumbling stone in the transition 
process, with the ruling apartheid party members requiring immunity from 
prosecution as a condition of their peaceful exit from power.10 A solution 
was negotiated with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC)—a commission equipped with issuing amnesty (from 
domestic prosecution) to those who testified before it and were able to 
establish that the acts which they committed had a political purpose.11
Ultimately, the TRC granted 1167 applications for amnesty, out of a total of 
7000 applications received; those who did not receive amnesty from the 
TRC remained subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution in South 
African courts.12 In South Africa, the goal of peace resulted in the creation 
                                                          
United States, NACLA (Dec. 10, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/12/10/torture-report-latin-america’s-
lessons-united-states.
8. Burt, supra note 7.
9. Jasmina Brankovic, Responsabilidad y Reconciliación Nacional en Sudáfrica 
[Accountability and National Reconciliation in South Africa], EDICIONES INFOJUS: DERECHOS 
HUMANOS 2, no. 4, 2013, at 55–86.
10. Unit 6. The End of Apartheid and the Birth of Democracy, S. AFR.: OVERCOMING 
APARTHEID BUILDING DEMOCRACY, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2018); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in
TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 143–44 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis 
Thompson eds., 2000).
11. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2018).
12. TRC Category - 3.  Amnesty, TRACES TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?
cat=3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
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of a modified accountability mechanism, the TRC.  While many have 
applauded the TRC as an appropriate mechanism for achieving peace and 
reconciliation in South Africa, some have questioned whether such 
commissions in general provide appropriate accountability for those 
responsible of the most serious atrocities and violations of international 
law.13 It may be concluded that in South Africa, peace and justice co-
existed, but that justice took on a modified accountability form through the 
TRC.
The former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone are examples of transitional 
justice scenarios where peace and accountability co-existed almost 
simultaneously.  In the former Yugoslavia, the civil war ended with the 
Dayton Peace Accords of 1995; the accords did not include an immunity 
clause for any Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim leaders and their respective 
regimes.14 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
which was established through Security Council Chapter VII powers a few 
years before the Dayton Peace Accords, was ultimately able to prosecute 
most senior leaders of former Yugoslav states.15 Thus, in the former 
Yugoslavia, justice was not sacrificed for peace, and the pursuit of peace 
did not derail the pursuit of accountability.  Instead, peace and justice were 
correctly sequenced and it may be argued that both were achieved.
In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lome Peace Accord contained an amnesty 
provision.16 When the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 
2002, the Court determined that it could impose accountability of those who 
may have been subjects of the amnesty provision of the Lome Peace
Accord, because the amnesty concerned domestic prosecutions only and the
Court was of an international/hybrid character.17 In Sierra Leone, like in 
                                                          
13. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) et al. v. President of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 22 para. 21 (S. Afr.).
14. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. 
& Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75; see also John R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of 
the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 226, 234 (1996) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords did not contain an amnesty clause).
15. The ICTY “was established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter as an enforcement measure aimed at restoring and maintaining international peace and 
security in the region (S/RES/827 (1993)).”  Jones, supra note 14, at 226 n.2 (1996).  For a general 
discussion of the relationship between the Dayton Peace Accords and the ICTY, see id. at 226–44.
16. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone, Sierra-Leona-R.U.F./S.L., July 7, 1999.
17. Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber, May 25, 2004, SCSL-2004-14-
AR72(E), (SL); Press Release, Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Special Court Rejects Amnesty for 
the Worst Crimes Known to Humanity (Mar. 18, 2004) (“The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that, 
in accordance with international law, the general amnesty granted in the 1999 Lomé peace agreement 
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the former Yugoslavia, peace and justice were properly sequenced and 
somewhat simultaneously achieved.
The above examples demonstrate that peace and justice may co-exist, 
and that, if sequenced properly, both may be achieved in a transitional 
society.  In Syria, the goal of peace should not altogether trump the goal of 
accountability.  Peace and accountability could co-exist, similar to the 
South African, Yugoslav, and Sierra Leonian experiences.  Peace and 
justice could co-exist either pursuant to the South African model, where 
accountability took the form of a TRC, or pursuant to the former 
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone models, where a peace treaty was signed and 
accountability imposed, through an international or hybrid tribunal, in the 
short term following the achievement of peace.  The section below will 
briefly discuss existing accountability options for Syria.
III. EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE MODELS
Several accountability models exist and have already been utilized in 
different international and non-international conflicts.  Such accountability 
models include national prosecutions, internationalized domestic war 
crimes chambers, hybrid tribunals, international ad hoc tribunals, and the 
ICC.18 In addition, truth and reconciliation commissions, as mentioned 
above, have been formed and analyzed as alternative models of 
accountability.19 This section will briefly describe such existing models of 
accountability while assessing whether they could be utilized in the Syrian 
context.
Perpetrators of atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, or other violations, can be prosecuted in national courts, provided 
that such national jurisdictions have penal laws which have codified such 
international crimes as well as appropriate jurisdictional statutes.20 As of 
today, many national jurisdictions have penal codes which embrace 
international crimes.21 In addition, perpetrators of international offenses 
                                                          
was ‘ineffective’ in preventing international courts, such as the Special Court, or foreign courts from 
prosecuting crimes against humanity and war crimes.”).
18. See generally Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of Their 
Utility Post-ICC, 19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237 (2013) (noting different types of models of 
accountability and existing tribunals).
19. Abdul Rahman Lamin, Building Peace Through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 38 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 295 (2003) 
(discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and accountability).
20. See, e.g., Helmut Kreicker, National Prosecution of International Crimes from A 
Comparative Perspective, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 313 (2005).
21. DAVID A. KAYE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., COUNCIL SPECIAL REP. NO. 61, JUSTICE 
BEYOND THE HAGUE: SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL 
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can often be charged and prosecuted for domestic law offenses, such as 
murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, etc.22 Most national jurisdictions require 
a nexus between the perpetrator or investigated alleged crime and their own 
territory.23 Thus, many national courts will exercise jurisdiction over an 
offender if the offender is a national of the prosecuting state, if victims were 
nationals of the prosecuting state, or if the national security interests of the 
prosecuting state were somehow harmed by the underlying criminal 
offense.24 Some countries have codified the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and allow for prosecutions of all alleged criminals for 
particularly heinous offenses, such as genocide, torture, slavery, etc.25
Perpetrators of atrocities in Syria could be prosecuted in Syrian 
national courts for domestic/Syrian law offenses under Syrian criminal 
law.26 Syrian courts would surely have jurisdiction over Syrian perpetrators 
for alleged crimes committed on Syrian territory.  This scenario, although 
theoretically possible, is not feasible in the current political climate and 
leadership of President Assad.  It is unlikely that President Assad would 
allow Syrian courts to investigate atrocities which may potentially implicate 
his own regime.  In addition, because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, it is 
uncertain how much capacity Syrian domestic courts would have to 
undertake a complex investigation and prosecution, which could implicate a 
multitude of evidentiary documents, witnesses, and other resources.27
                                                          
COURTS 6 (June 2011), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/05/Beyond_The_Hague_CSR
61.pdf (noting that countries such as Argentina, Bosnia, Colombia and Germany have established 
national courts and specialized chambers capable of prosecuting individuals for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and that many NATO countries have the practice of prosecuting their own military 
personnel accused of war crimes).
22. See, e.g., Courts of First Resort: Prosecuting International Crimes at the National Level,
ICTJ (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.ictj.org/news/courts-first-resort-prosecuting-international-crimesnati
onal-level (reporting on the Greentree Conference on Complementarity, at which conference 
participants assessed national prosecutions for the purposes of ICC complementarity with respect to 
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, and Ivory Coast.); see also
National Prosecutions of International Crimes, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, https://www.mpicc.de/en/forschung/forschungsarbeit/strafrecht/nation
ale_strafverfolgung.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (reporting on conferences and reports issued for 
various countries around the world and their capacity to prosecute international crimes, in the context of 
ICC complementarity regime).
23. Kreicker, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. See generally Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in 
National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829 (2015).
26. Kreicker, supra note 20. This conclusion flows from the principle of territoriality of 
jurisdiction: the idea that states have territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed on their territory.
27. Mark Chadwick, Jusice in Syria:  Five Ways to Prosecute International Crime,
CONVERSATION (July 10, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/justice-in-syria-five-ways-toprose
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether the Syrian judiciary is truly independent
and neutral, and whether it would be able to lead a politically charged 
investigation without interference from the Assad regime.28
National courts of other states, however, could investigate and
possibly prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Syria.  These types of 
proceedings can occur either in situations where the prosecuting authority 
has a nexus to the alleged crime (for example, if the perpetrator is a national 
or resident of the prosecuting state), or in countries where universal 
jurisdiction statutes exist and where the heinous and universal nature of the 
alleged crime justifies prosecution by any state’s courts.29 According to 
recent reports, investigations into Syria are already occurring in France, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.30 In 
Sweden, three individuals have been separately tried and convicted of 
crimes committed in Syria’s war after they left the country and traveled to 
Sweden.31 In addition, German authorities have successfully prosecuted 
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.32 More investigations and cases of this 
sort could take place in the future, and it is human rights defenders’ hope 
that the Mechanism will continue to assist with such prosecutions and 
cases.33 While prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities in national 
courts under universal jurisdiction constitutes imperfect justice (because 
such cases are often piecemeal, unlikely to satisfy all victims, result in trials 
in absentia, and may result in dismissals), slow and imperfect justice may 
                                                          
cute-international-crime-75908 (“Prosecution of atrocities in the Syrian courts would present 
considerable logistical and financial difficulties for a ruined state. Even if national trials were feasible 
(if funded externally, for instance) they would risk being politically vulnerable to manipulation by the 
ruling elite, whoever that may be.”).
28. Id.
29. Justice for Syria, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/03/
justice-for-syria/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L].
30. Q&A: First Cracks to Impunity in Syria, Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:01 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/20/qa-first-cracks-impunity-syria-iraq [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
WATCH: Q&A]; see also Chadwick, supra note 27 (reporting that in Sweden, Finland, Germany and 
Switzerland refugees present in those countries and suspected of international crimes are being 
prosecuted under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction).
31. Vera Padberg, Prosecutions of Syrian War Crimes, ILAWYER BLOG (Feb. 18, 2017), http://
ilawyerblog.com/prosecutions-of-syrian-war-crimes/.
32. Syria:  First Atrocities Trials Held in Europe, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/03/syria-first-atrocities-trials-held-europe (reporting that 
German courts have successfully prosecuted and convicted Syrian perpetrators, albeit on terrorism 
charges, and that Swedish courts have also successfully prosecuted and convicted perpetrators of Syrian 
atrocities).
33. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29.
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be beneficial to no justice at all.34 According to war crimes prosecutor 
Stephen Rapp, “the slow-moving wheels of justice eventually caught up 
with Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic of the former 
Yugoslavia.”35 As of today, it appears that the Mechanism will cooperate 
with national jurisdictions and will share some of its investigative work 
with national prosecutors and that national prosecutions may represent the 
only near-future model of accountability for Syria.
Because national prosecutions often suffer from “defects,” such as 
inexperienced judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, inadequate 
criminal laws and jurisdictional statutes, and insufficient resources, some 
countries have created specialized war crimes chambers within their 
existing judiciaries to investigate and prosecute cases involving 
international crimes and atrocities.36 Such war crimes chambers already 
exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.37 The advantage of specialized war 
crimes chambers is that they may receive assistance from the international 
community through programs to train judges, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel, assistance with the possible re-drafting of national penal laws as 
well as with communications and outreach strategies, and other financial 
resources.  Some domestic war chambers may become “internationalized” 
in light of significant involvement and assistance by the international 
community.38 Examples of internationalized domestic war crimes 
chambers include the Iraqi Special Tribunal, as well as the new Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers.39
                                                          
34. See HUM. RTS. WATCH: Q&A, supra note 30.
35. James Reinl, Could Syria’s ‘Prosecutor Without A Tribunal’ Work?, ALJAZEERA (May 
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work-17052911
0910869.html.
36. Sterio, supra note 18, at 244.
37. Id. at 245 (noting that the Bosnian War Chamber “is a specialized domestic chamber that 
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the ICTY as part of its completion strategy, or 
investigated on its own,” that the Chamber applies local law and is located in the capital city of 
Sarajevo, and that the Chamber “employs a mix of international staff, as well as local Bosnian Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims”).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF.,
https://www.scp-ks.org/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter KOSOVO] (“Kosovo Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office are part of the judicial system of Kosovo. The Chambers 
are attached to each level of the Kosovo court system . . . .  They are of temporary nature with a specific 
mandate and jurisdiction, namely over certain crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes 
under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000 . . . . The 
Specialist Chambers have a seat in The Hague, the Netherlands, and are to be staffed with international 
judges, prosecutors and staff.”).
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Under the current Syrian leadership of President Assad, it is unrealistic 
to expect the creation of a specialized war chamber.  The same deficiencies 
which would plague a national prosecution in Syria would similarly affect a 
specialized tribunal or chamber.  Because of resources necessary to create a 
specialized war crimes chamber, it is also unrealistic to expect that a 
foreign jurisdiction would create a specialized chamber within its own 
judicial system solely for the benefit of prosecuting Syrian atrocities.  The 
existing and past war crimes chambers and tribunals, in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Iraq have all been created toward the purpose of prosecuting 
individuals responsible for atrocities committed in those same countries.40
A specialized war crimes chamber, or a national prosecution, in Syria could 
however exist if a new regime were to be put in place or elected. If
President Assad were to step down, a new leadership committed to 
transitional justice may be interested and able to prosecute perpetrators 
either in Syrian national courts or in a specialized war crimes chamber.  As 
of today, this is a remote possibility.
A third model of accountability which has been utilized by some 
countries over the past two decades is the creation of a hybrid tribunal.  
Hybrid tribunals are typically established through an agreement between 
the host nation, affected by a conflict and resolving transitional justice 
issues, and the international community, typically the United Nations.41
Recent examples of hybrid tribunals include the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.42 Hybrid tribunals typically 
apply a mixture of domestic and international law and are typically 
composed of judicial chambers consisting of domestic and international 
judges.43 They may be located in the host country and thus may have a 
stronger territorial nexus to the conflict which they are trying to address.44
In theory, one could envision the creation of a hybrid tribunal for Syria
in the future.  Academics have already proposed the creation of such a 
tribunal.45 In the United States, a group of senators recently introduced a 
                                                          
40. See KOSOVO, supra note 39; Sterio, supra note 18.
41. Sterio, supra note 18, at 240–41.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 241.
44. See, e.g., Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice,
41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1013, 1023–25 (2009).
45. See Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts to Unveil Draft Statute for Syrian Tribunal on October 
3, 8:30-9:30 AM, At the National Press Club in Washington D.C., PILPG (Sept. 25, 2013), https://
www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/blue-ribbon-panel-of-experts-to-unveil-draftstatuteforsy
rian-tribunal-on-october-3-830-930-am-at-the-national-press-club-in-washington-d-c/ (reporting that a 
panel of former international tribunal chief prosecutors, international judges, and leading experts has 
prepared a Draft Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes).
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bipartisan bill—Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act—aimed at 
investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Syria 
and at imposing accountability on Syrian President Assad.46 In this bill, the 
senators called on the United States Secretary of State to assist in creating a 
hybrid tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for most 
heinous abuses in Syria, as part of “credible transitional justice efforts.”47
Nonetheless, the hybrid tribunal option remains difficult to implement 
while President Assad is in power.  The establishment of a hybrid tribunal 
presupposes the host country’s agreement, and as mentioned above, it is 
unlikely that the Assad regime would agree to an investigation and 
prosecutions by a hybrid tribunal which would implicate itself.48 If Syrian 
leadership changed and a new regime accepted to work with the 
international community to establish a hybrid tribunal, this option may be 
attractive for a conflict such as the one in Syria.  One of the main 
advantages of hybrid tribunals is their ability to tailor their statutes to the 
particular conflict they are seeking to address, by incorporating both 
domestic and international law offenses.  A hybrid tribunal for Syria could 
prosecute perpetrators for international crimes, but could also incorporate 
Syrian penal law offenses, if necessary.  Another advantage of such 
tribunals is their proximity to the conflict, if they are located in the host 
country. This is helpful because in terms of outreach to the Syrian people, 
reconciliation, and national healing, a hybrid tribunal located in Syria 
would be able to more easily investigate and collect evidence and would 
likely perform better.49 As of today, because the probability of regime 
change in Syria remains low for the near future, a hybrid tribunal remains a 
theoretical but unlikely option.
A fourth model of accountability involves the creation of an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal.  The United Nations Security Council, 
through its Chapter VII powers, created two such tribunals in the 1990s, for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.50 These tribunals were created 
against the wishes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and were located 
outside of these two countries, at The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania, 
                                                          
46. US Senators Call for ‘Hybrid Tribunal’ for Syrian War Crimes, RT (Apr. 8, 2017, 11:16), 
https://www.rt.com/usa/384024-hybrid-tribunal-syria-bill/.
47. Id.
48. Chadwick, supra note 27 (“If the Bashar al-Assad regime is to remain in power in Syria 
this may create significant difficulties for this approach. Its success would depend on the government’s 
willingness to cooperate and submit itself to investigation alongside opposition groups.”).
49. See Sterio, supra note 18, at 240.
50. Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can Be Learned from the Ad Hoc Tribunals?, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL'Y 13, 13–14 (2002) (noting the establishing of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
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respectively.51 International ad hoc tribunals are composed of international 
judges and apply international criminal law; they typically do not 
incorporate any of the features of domestic criminal systems and do not 
employ local judges.52 Although such tribunals do not necessitate the 
relevant country’s approval, they do require a Security Council resolution 
because they involve a process which breaches the affected country’s 
sovereignty.  In the Syrian context, Russia and China have already vetoed 
resolutions which would have authorized the referral of the Syrian situation 
to the ICC, and it is highly likely that Russia and China would also veto a 
resolution seeking to establish the creation of a new ad hoc tribunal for 
Syria.53 Thus, this option remains of limited utility today.  If the geo-
political situation were to change drastically and if Russia and China ceased 
to support Assad, or if Assad were to step down and a new regime, less pro-
Russian and pro-Chinese, were put in power in Syria, then an international 
ad hoc tribunal could be possible.  In the short term, this is unlikely to
occur.
Last, the ICC is another model of accountability, where perpetrators of 
atrocities, such as those committed in Syria, can be prosecuted.  The ICC 
has jurisdiction over three main categories of crimes: genocide; crimes 
against humanity; and war crimes.54 In order for a case to come within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, the alleged crime or crimes must have been committed 
on the territory of a member state, or the perpetrator must be a national of a 
member state.55 Additionally, cases may be referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council.56 Syria is not a member of the ICC.57 Assuming war 
crimes and crimes against humanity took place in Syria, the ICC would 
have jurisdiction only over cases involving so-called “foreign fighters”—
individuals who are nationals of an ICC member state and who chose to 
fight in the Syrian conflict.58 The court would not have jurisdiction over 
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cases involving Syrian nationals, because the alleged crimes occurred in 
Syria, on the territory of a non-member state, and the Syrian perpetrators 
are not nationals of a member state.59 As mentioned above, the United 
Nations Security Council can refer any case to the ICC; in the case of Syria, 
however, Russia and China have already exercised their respective veto 
powers over a proposed resolution referring the Syrian situation to the 
ICC.60 Thus, the ICC is of limited utility in the Syrian context, as it can 
only assume jurisdiction over cases involving foreign fighters who are 
nationals of ICC member states.
This relative lack of accountability mechanisms for Syria—as detailed 
above, in the current situation, where the only viable accountability model 
is national prosecutions of perpetrators in the courts of third countries 
which are willing and able to take such remote cases—has led the General 
Assembly to envision a more creative solution.  Thus, in December 2016, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution creating a Mechanism for Syria.61
The section below will discuss the Mechanism’s main features and will 
assess whether the Mechanism can lead toward accountability in Syria.
IV. IIIM
As mentioned above, the United Nations General Assembly created a 
Mechanism for Syria in December 2016.62 The Mechanism is not a 
tribunal, and its purpose instead is to collect and preserve evidence, which 
will later be shared with relevant international and national tribunals that 
may in the future prosecute those responsible for crimes committed in 
Syria.63 The Mechanism’s mandate is to focus on the most serious crimes: 
genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.64 The Mechanism will 
be located in Geneva, and it will be staffed with an international judge or 
prosecutor and renown experts in international criminal law.65 The 
Mechanism’s primary purpose will be to collect and organize evidence 
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(both inculpatory and exculpatory), which will in the future be shared with 
competent tribunals and which will contribute toward future prosecutions of 
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.66 The Mechanism, however, will not share 
information with jurisdictions and authorities which impose the death 
penalty, and/or which do not abide by basic international human rights 
standards, such as the right to a fair trial.67 According to one set of 
commentators, “[t]he Mechanism is an important addition to the 
international justice landscape” which may “provide a bridge between the 
contemporaneous collection of evidence and its use in trials that may take 
place years or even decades later.”68 Overall, the Mechanism’s ultimate 
goal “is to ensure justice for the victims of these crimes and for all the 
Syrian people affected by the violence.”69
For now, according to Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human 
Rights Watch, the Mechanism is a “prosecutor without a tribunal,” and it 
remains to be seen how the evidence it collects may be used in the future, 
and whether the Mechanism will ultimately contribute toward the 
protection of human rights.70 Because of Russian and Chinese veto, 
Security Council has been deadlocked and it is unlikely that the Syrian 
situation will be referred to the ICC in the near future, or that an ad hoc 
tribunal will be established for Syria.71 Thus, it appears more likely that the 
Mechanism will share evidence and information with national jurisdictions, 
prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities under a universal jurisdiction 
model.
In sum, it may be argued that the Mechanism is the first step necessary 
toward protecting human rights in Syria, by collecting evidence necessary 
toward successful future prosecutions and by initiating the accountability 
conversation regarding Syria within the international community.  As 
mentioned above, in light of the Russian and Chinese veto, it is unlikely 
that the Security Council will refer the Syrian situation to the ICC in the 
near future.72 It is more likely that the Syrian situation will be investigated 
within national jurisdictions.  If President Assad were to step down and if a 
new regime were to be elected or otherwise installed in Syria, a new hybrid 
tribunal could be established for Syria.  Such a hybrid tribunal in Syria 
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could build upon the legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and it could contribute further toward the 
protection of human rights in the international community.  The Mechanism 
is likely to work with both national jurisdictions as well as with any Syria 
hybrid tribunal in the future; it is, therefore, the first important step toward 
accountability for Syria.
V. CONCLUSION
With respect to Syria, it may be that the war ends in regime transition 
and that members of the Assad leadership face accountability, either in the 
ICC (assuming no Russian or Chinese veto), or in an ad hoc tribunal, set up 
by the Security Council or negotiated by the new Syrian leadership and the 
international community.  If Assad were to step down from power, a new 
Syrian government could also choose to initiate national prosecutions, or to 
establish a specialized war crimes chamber to try those responsible for the 
most serious atrocities during the Syrian civil war.  Because many 
accountability options remain open in the future, the ongoing quest for 
peace in Syria should not sacrifice accountability.  Peace negotiators should 
focus instead on ending violence without promising blanket immunity to 
those involved in the conflict, thereby leaving open the option of near-
future accountability, through domestic or international prosecutions.  
Peace and justice can be sequenced properly in Syria, as both of these goals 
are fundamental to the achievement of global peace and stability.
